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INTRODUCTION
Memory research and theory have been dominated by cognitive psychology for
half a century or more now (Delaney & A ustin, 1998; Estes, 1988; Mahadevan, M alone,
& Bailey, 2002; W ixted, 1998). Estes suggests that the concept o f memory is m uch m ore
relevant to the organization and later retrieval o f stored information than it is to current
behavioral performance or to that which m ight be observed over a very short period o f
time in a laboratory experiment. Following from this, cognitive psychologists claim that
research programs that purport to examine the organization o f information (inform ation
processing models) would be better suited to examination o f memory phenomena than
would behavior-analytic programs w hose goals often involve the explanation o f
performance or behavior and often in controlled, laboratory settings (Estes, 1982).
However, W ixted contrasts this cognitive view o f memory, which involves stored and/or
processed information, with a behavior-analytic view, which he describes as referring,
not to stored information, but to the ability to behave differently based on the effects o f
past experience. Furthermore, W ixted then says that memory phenomena may actually
be better suited to behavior-analytic research than to cognitive study because behavior
analysts would be more likely to consider issues such as an individual’s history o f
reinforcement for remembering and m ight be m ore likely to approach memory research
as a search for empirical laws o f behavior. Estes and Wixted would probably agree on
the main points o f the above definitions but w ould surely differ on the relative
importance they each place on behavior in relation to, or as evidence o f that w hich is
remembered.
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Cognitive approaches to the study o f m emory typically involve exam ination o f
“levels” o f mem ory such as long-term memory (LTM) and short-term memory (STM )
(Mahadevan et ah, 2002; W ixted, 1998) as well as the processing steps o f coding, storage
and retrieval (Watkins, 1990). LTM is typically differentiated from STM by differences
in the forgetting' function (Nilsson, 1979) or procedurally, by the amount o f tim e betw een
stimulus presentation and the opportunity for recall or another performance based
measure (Wixted). STM m ight typically refer to procedures lasting 30 s or less while
LTM might examine recall over periods o f hours, days or weeks. However, as W ixted
suggests, the greater-than or less-than 30 s distinction is not relevant in cases such as
remembering a phone number, in which the subject might rehearse the num ber and thus
continually reset the delay interval to zero.
Cognitive researchers and theoreticians have been critical o f their own w ork in
this area (see Tulving, 1979; Watkins, 1990). W atkins has outlined a number o f
problems in the m odem cognitive exploration o f memory. First, the cognitive approach
is heavily based on constm ction and refinement o f theories o f memory. W atkins
proposes that this is an essential component o f cognitive work in this area and th at m any
theoreticians are skeptical o f researchers who do not develop their own theories bu t are
content merely to explore theories o f others. Second, the main problem that he says
comes from this overabundance o f cognitive memory theory is that the theories are all
mediational and thus involve a search for some sort o f memory trace or storage
mechanism. Finally, W atkins states, “the essential problem with mediationism and the
reason for the theory quagmire it has created is that its three stages (encoding, retention
or storage and retrieval) constitute a level o f complexity beyond the analytic p o w er o f
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experimental psychology” (p. 329). Tulving has also been skeptical o f progress in the
area o f memory research and theorizing. He suggests that if “progress” was to be
determined by the degree to which a comprehensive and cumulative theoretical
framework was established, it w ould not be easy to say that cognitive psychology had
made much o f it in the last hundred years (Tulving).
If it is true that “memory theorizing is going now here” (Watkins, 1990, p. 328)
and that little progress has been made by constructing elaborate theories of m em ory
(Tulving, 1979) it m ay be time to retum to the real issue at hand, namely that when
organisms interact with the environment, the environm ent changes them in some w ay and
the resulting altered organism behaves differently (Skinner, 1987). Cognitive m em ory
researchers are reported to be prim arily involved in a search for what it is that has
changed when something has been learned or rem em bered - a representation, engram, or
some sort o f physical trace o f the original stimulus (M ayer, 2003; Watkins). Skinner
(1987; 1989) suggests that rather than look for the physiological product o f experience,
we leave that search to physiologists and concentrate our efforts on examination o f the
altered abilities o f the changed organism - the exam ination o f behavior which is
psychology’s true subject matter. Even some cognitively oriented researchers would
agree with at least the first assertion. As Estes (1982) stated, “In fact, human memory
does not, in a literal sense, store anything; it sim ply changes as a function o f experience”
(p. 188). Moving beyond the storage metaphor then, let us proceed with an account o f
human performance over time that looks at the altered ability of individuals to behave as
a function o f environment-behavior interactions.
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A notable behavioral interpretation o f m em ory is that o f Palmer (1991), in w hich
he suggests that researchers should address “rem em bering” rather than “mem ory” since
the latter is not a helpful or even a coherent concept and it “usurps the role o f explanation
and impedes the search for controlling variables for current behavior” (p. 261).
“Remembering,” according to Palmer, could be better described as involving one o f two
classes o f contingencies; It is either an issue o f stimulus control or one o f problem
solving. In the form er case, that o f stimulus control, we are likely to experience such
memories as “spontaneous” or in other words, we m ay find ourselves behaving som ew hat
automatically. W hen one has learned to name a car or a tree, the names are produced
seemingly automatically given the appropriate stimuli; likewise with the behaviors o f
walking, driving and swimming. These types o f behavior are all likely shaped by direct
contact with the relevant contingencies and are under the stimulus control o f particular
features o f the environment. Because one walks, swims or says “car” only in the
presence of specific stimuli, these may easily be seen to involve stimulus control.
Because they involve behavior that we can do currently, but represent learning that has
occurred some time in the past, they may also be seen to involve remembering.
In terms o f Palm er’s analysis, problem solving is m ore relevant to the current
discussion. When an individual is confronted with an opportunity to remember and does
not have current access to all o f the necessary variables, he or she engages in “precuErent”
behavior o f generating supplementary discriminative stimuli until one such stim ulus is
sufficient to occasion the answer to the current problem. Skinner defined precurrent
behavior as behavior that functions “mainly to make subsequent behavior more effective”
(Skinner, 1968, p. 124). The process o f remembering as an instance o f problem solving
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then involves generating supplementary stimuli until one such stimulus allows solving o f
the problem and then recognition that the correct answer is now available or that the
problem is now able to be solved. This recognition then allows the individual to stop
generating supplementary stimuli and to emit the correct response. Palmer’s
conceptualization o f memory as a problem solving exercise closely follows that o f
Skinner (1953; 1968).
I f remembering involves the development o f stimulus control and/or problem
solving, what o f forgetting? Malott and Suarez (2003) state rather succinctly: “Forget
forgetting - it doesn’t exist” (p. 122). These authors echo sentiments similar to those
suggested earlier by Skinner (1953; 1974) and Palm er (1991) that “forgetting” involves
either the “failure o f a discriminative stimulus to occasion a response” (Palmer; p. 267) or
that competing responses have interfered with the em ission o f the correct or
“remembered” response. The traditional approach to forgetting is that it is a decline in
the ability to respond or to produce information as a function o f time. However,
according to Palmer there is not currently any evidence o f a process through w hich
stimulus control weakens simply through the passage o f time. In fact, Skinner (1960)
illustrated in at least one situation that “forgetting” was a function o f extinction and not
simply the passage o f time. The idea o f response com petition is consistent with both
behavioral conceptualizations and traditional models such as retroactive and proactive
interference (Watkins, 1990; Wixted, 1998) in which learning interferes either with
something leamed earlier or something that will be leam ed later. Regarding memory as a
behavioral process suggests that “remembering” and “forgetting” are better described as
learning phenomena than as “abilities” or as physical entities. Thus, as Mahadevan et al.
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(2002) have said, “the construct o f memory is not required in order to understand
remembering” (p. 3).
Much o f what w e call learning can be seen as involving some sort of
remembering, as in w hen a stimulus comes to control a response and later encounters
with that same stimulus elicit or evoke similar responses (W ixted, 1998). M atching to
sample (MTS) is a fam ily o f experimental procedures that have been used extensively to
study a wide variety o f learning phenomena in humans and non-humans (Saunders &
Williams, 1998). MTS is a type o f conditional discrimination procedure, in which a
sample stimulus (conditional stimulus) alters the function o f other stimuli, the
discriminative stimulus (S+) and the S delta (S-; Saunders & W illiams). A variety o f
MTS procedures have been developed and used in non-human as well as human
experimental preparations’. A typical arrangement o f simultaneous MTS involves the
presentation o f a sample stimulus (often the center key on a three-key array), a response
to the sample key (observing or orienting response) that turns on the comparison stimulus
keys, and a response to one comparison key that has some property in common (often
color) with the sample key (Gumming & Berryman, 1965; Saunders & Williams). This
arrangement is called “simultaneous matching” because the sample key remains visible
after the comparisons have appeared and both sample and com parison stimuli are
simultaneously visible. Simultaneous matching is perhaps the sim plest MTS
arrangement. Other arrangements based on this framework arrange such contingencies as
the training of a number o f color matches then testing for generality o f responding to
“sameness” (identity MTS; see [Holth, 2003] for a discussion o f “identity”); providing
reinforcement for selection o f the comparison that is not similar to the sample (oddity
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MTS or non-matching to sample); or reinforcing selection o f comparisons that have som e
sort o f consistent relation to the sample such as “brighter than,” or “rotated 90 degrees
clockwise” (relational M TS; see Lowenkron, 1984). Other variations o f the basic M TS
preparation include changes in temporal arrangements. An arrangement similar to that
described above, but in which the orienting response (response to the sample stim ulus)
turns on the comparison stimuli and turns o ff the sample stimulus is called zero delay
MTS (Cumming, Berryman, & Cohen, 1965). D elayed match to sample (DMTS)
procedures are similar to zero delay procedures but insert various intervals of time
between the offset o f the sample stimulus and the onset o f the comparison stimulus (see
Blough, 1959; Cumming & Berryman; Lowenkron, 1988; Saunders & Williams). In
typical DMTS arrangements, simultaneous and/or zero delay matching is established
first, then delay intervals may be introduced and increased as performance criteria are
reached (Ferraro, Francis, & Perkins, 1971; Merle et al, 1998; Sargisson & White, 2001).
Many, if not all, DMTS experiments have been influenced by the classic study in
this area, that o f Blough (1959). In this study, utilizing a DMTS arrangement very
similar to that described above, reinforcement was provided for pigeons’ selection o f
comparison stimuli (either steady or flickering lights) that were .sim ila r to the original
sample stimulus (also either a steady or a flickering light). Delay intervals ranged from 0
to 10 s. Blough observed that two o f the four pigeons independently developed samplespecific behavior chains during delay intervals. These two birds were then able to
perform DMTS selections at significantly higher percentages correct than the birds that
did not emit these chains. It was Blough’s conclusion that the sample-specific, response
chains performed a “mediation” function that essentially provided supplementary
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stimulation during the delay interval and up to the point o f comparison selection. One o f
these “differentially mediating” birds responded correctly on greater than 90% o f the
trials, at delays o f up to 10 s, but only when a sample-specific mediating behavior was
performed.
Recent behavior-analytic studies o f relevant hum an behavior include
examinations o f DM TS and investigations o f precurrent behavior. Parsons, Taylor and
Joyce (1981) described three ways in which precurrent behavior can make “subsequent”
or current behavior m ore effective. First, the precurrent response “can alter the
probability that the organism makes functional contact with the discriminative events
controlling the current operant (p. 253).” Examples o f this include observing, orienting
and attending responses. Second, the precurrent response can alter the probability o f
reinforcement for another response. In a study by Poison and Parsons (1994) college
students earned points by pressing either the right or the left key o f a computer m ouse. In
the “no precurrent contingency condition”, right key-presses were reinforced w ith .02
probability and left key presses had no scheduled consequences. During the “precurrent
contingency condition” left key-presses had the effect o f changing the reinforcement
schedule for right key presses to .08 for 15 s. Thus the precurrent response, left key
presses, changed the reinforcement schedule for right key presses and made them “more
effective” in terms o f increasing the reinforcement that was available. Finally, in the third
type o f precurrent behavior, the precurrent operant response accomplishes a prom pting or
mediating role that facilitates correct performance and thus reinforcement for the
subsequent, or “current” response. It is this third type o f precurrent contingency that is
most relevant to the current investigation.
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Parsons (1976) examined the ability o f children (4.2 - 5.1 y.o.) to solve num eric
matching problems with and without precurrent (counting) behavior. In the first baseline
condition (differential “reinforcement” for correct responses), mean correct perform ance
across all five children was 50.4%. W hen overt counting was trained, correct responding
increased to an average o f 97%. Thus, contingent provision o f tokens and praise
following correct responding (results did not indicate that reinforcement had occurred)
was not enough to bring about an adequate change in behavior.
In a later study, Parsons, Taylor and Joyce (1981) trained three groups o f 5-year
olds to perform a brief-interval DMTS task under one o f the following conditions:
common collateral behavior (regardless o f the stimulus presented always press top k ey on
a five-key, “Greek Cross” array); non-differential collateral behavior, (press either top or
bottom key); and differential collateral behavior, (press either the top or bottom key
depending on the original sample stimulus). In study 1 they formd that children who
performed a sample-specific task (difTerential collateral behavior) were better able to
match following a 0.1 s delay than children who were in either the common or non
differential collateral response groups. One child out o f four in the common collateral
response group leam ed to match at the 90% criterion after two sessions. Demonstrating a
response acquisition pattem similar to the common collateral response child who m et
criterion, 3 out o f 4 children in the non-differential collateral response group m et the 90%
criterion within 4 sessions at the same delay interval. One child consistently responded at
about chance levels. O f the 4 children in the differential collateral response group, 3
began the DMTS condition with criterion-level responding and thus needed no training.
One child in this group never responded at levels above chance. Study 2 was conducted
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with only the children w ho met the mastery criterion o f 90% or greater correct
responding in study 1 (one child from the common collateral response group and three
each from the non-differential and differential collateral response groups). This study
found that only children in the differential collateral response condition were able to
perform DMTS tasks at criterion level with delay intervals o f 5 or 10 s.
In a related study, Lowenkron (1988) trained four adolescents with mental
retardation to code tw o-dim ensional shapes by creating hand signs that were visually
similar to each shape. For example, one o f the two-dimensional stim uli appeared sim ilar
to a stylized “W ”. The hand sign that corresponded to this symbol was a vertically
positioned hand with the index, middle and ring fingers extended and slightly splayed.
Each other shape corresponded in a similar manner to a unique hand sign that bore some
visual similarity to the shape. These hand signs were maintained during the delay
interval in a DMTS task and resulted in the participants being able to correctly select
comparison stimuli after longer delays than without the hand signs.
Torgrud and H olbom (1989), in a systematic replication o f the study by Parsons et
al. (1981), examined the ability o f 5-year-old children to m atch to sam ple after delays o f
1, 3, 5, 10, and 15 s. In this between-groups study (additional w ithin subject control was
applied to one participant), the authors compared the effects o f a com m on mediating task
with those of a differential mediating task. The differential m ediating task consisted o f
pressing the top key on a 5-key “Greek Cross” array if the sample stim ulus color was red,
and the bottom key i f the sample stimulus was green. The common mediating task
consisted o f pressing the top key regardless o f the sample stimulus color. Although
group sizes were small (n -2 ) these researchers found that the children who performed a
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stimulus-specific task (differential mediating task) during the delay interval were able to
respond correctly at or near 100% for intervals up to 15 s. Comparable results w ere
observed when the task involved oddity matching. Children who did not perform
differential m ediating tasks were no t able to perform DMTS tasks over increasing delays.
The above studies (see especially Parsons, Taylor & Joyce, 1981; Torgrud &
Holbom, 1989) provide evidence for the effects o f stimulus-specific responses in
mediating DMTS tasks. However, both studies used prim arily between-groups designs
with relatively small groups (Parsons et al. used groups o f four; Torgrud & H olbom used
two groups o f two, but one child from each group left the study early). The current
studies (Experiments 1 and 2) systematically replicated the procedures o f Torgm d and
Holbom. Changes from the original study include the exclusive use o f within-subjects
controls as well as the use o f a sufficient number o f participants such that conclusions
about the results m ay be that much more convincing. Additionally, a follow-up
investigation (Experiment 3) examined whether the precurrent response could be reduced
(performed by the participants and then hidden from their view; see Skinner, 1953^) and
still function to effectively mediate delays. This hidden precurrent response in Study 3
effectively produced only proprioceptive stimuli and eliminated visual stimuli from any
role in the post-delay selection response. Although still involving physically apparent,
and thus potentially observable responses, these hidden precurrent responses more
closely approximated covert behavior. Thus, the current study examined whether simple
motor responses (and/or their resulting response products) could effectively mediate a
delay between a sample stimulus and a comparison stimulus, even when those
responses/stimuli are not visually apparent.
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METHOD
Participants, Apparatus and Setting
The current studies were completed by a total o f 8 participants. Three children
were assigned to and completed Experim ent 1, two were assigned to and completed
Experiment 2, and three children w ere assigned to and completed Experiment 3. In
addition to these children, one child did not complete Experiment 1 because o f a school
placement change, one child withdrew from the study, one was excused by the
experimenter because o f non compliant and uncooperative behavior, two children did not
complete Experiment 2 because o f school placement changes and one child was excused
from Experiment 3 because a consistent, chance-level baseline was not established. All
participants were neuro-typically developing (i.e., not developmentally disabled) 5-yearold pre-school and/or kindergarten students and were recruited from community p re
schools and day-care centers. W ritten informed consent was obtained from parents and
assent was obtained from participants prior to beginning the study. Participants who
were excused from the study were simply told that they were finished and were thanked
for their participation.
Apparatuses that were used included 2 IBM -PC compatible laptop computers w ith
33.8cm TFT and 30.7cm TFT displays, a separate num eric keypad (modified by
removing all keys except 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8, thus leaving a Greek Cross, or top-bottom-leftright-center pattem) hand-scored data sheets and. a custom developed program that did
the following: presented color samples; presented a distracter task (random single digit
numbers at a rate o f approximately 1 per s); recorded occurrence o f mediating task;
presented comparison stimuli; and recorded correct or incorrect selection responses. All

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
probe sessions were videotaped. The first two training sessions were videotaped for the
purposes o f training investigators. Specific data collected by hand and by computer
included number o f occurrences o f the mediating response, performance during the
rehearsal prevention task (hand-scored data only), correct and incorrect comparison
stimulus selection, and key position (left or right) o f selection (hand-scored data only).
Sessions were conducted in a separate room o r in a quiet area within a classroom
in the child’s school. One child was present for each session. The child was seated at a
small table immediately in fi-ont o f the laptop computer. A tri-fold poster board screen
(91.4cm X 121,9cm) was placed on the table and behind the computer. The experim enter
was seated next to the child. An additional observer was seated behind the child when
interobserver data were collected. Sessions lasted between 30 and 45 min and were
conducted between 1 and 4 times per week. W ithin each session, children worked on the
experimental tasks for about 8-12 min and then were allowed a 2.5-min play break.
During the breaks, children played with toys and/or consumed edibles provided by the
experimenter. Prior to the experiment, parents submitted lists o f preferred, non-preferred
and restricted toys and/or edibles.
Design and Data Collection
Each o f the three studies used within subject research designs that consisted o f
multiple baseline designs across participants and with reversals. Experiments 1
(consisting o f phases A-B-C-A) and 2 (phases A-C-A) were complementary in that
Experiment 2 was designed to control for any possible B-C order effects in Experim ent 1.
Experiment 3 (A-B-C-A) was a stand-alone study that also employed a multiple baseline
across participants w ith reversal.
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Dependent Variables
Primary dependent variables during probe sessions included percentage o f correct
comparison stimulus selection, performance o f m ediating task (Common M ediating
Response and all Differential Mediating Response conditions), and performance o f
rehearsal prevention task.
Interobserver Agreement
Interobserver agreement (lOA) data were collected in over 44% o f sessions. A n
agreement was scored when both the primary and secondary data collectors m arked either
(+) or (-) indicating correct or incorrect comparison selection responses. The point b y
point lOA method was used, in which lOA was calculated based on the outcome o f each
trial. lOA was calculated by dividing agreements by agreements plus disagreements and
multiplying by 100. lOA ranged from 95 to 100% and averaged 99.7%.
Stabilitv and M astery Criteria
Stability was defined as two or more consecutive data points in which a m ajority
of the data paths did not appear to show a trend, and was assessed through visual
inspection of graphical displays. For mastery criteria (all Differential Mediating
Response conditions), responding was required to be at or above the following for two
consecutive sessions, with a minimum o f three total sessions and across a majority o f
data paths (all three data paths in Experiment 3): Experiment 1 —85%; Experiment 2 75%; and Experiment 3 - 86%. Different criteria were necessitated by the varying
number o f trials per session in each o f the three experiments.
General Procedures
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Throughout each training and probe phase, correct responses were followed b y an
indicator sound (computer-generated tone), delivery o f a token and brief praise. Tokens
were placed on one o f a series o f 7 randomly chosen token boards whose average value
was 20. Each time a token board was filled the child was given a play break and the
experimenter replaced the token board with one w ith a different value. During play
breaks participants were allowed to play with toys or consume edibles, as they chose.
Incorrect responses were followed by the absence o f the tone, token and praise, a b rie f
inter-trial interval and presentation o f the next trial.
Assessment
During the first session, children’s abilities to tact colors (blue and red) and to
read numbers (1-10) were assessed. D uring the first session o f study 3, children’s
abilities to show a “thumbs-up” and to cross their fingers were also assessed.
Training
Prior to baseline children were taught to select comparison stimuli by pressing the
key on the keypad that corresponded to a color image on the computer screen, to select a
comparison under a simultaneous then a zero delay arrangement, to read the numbers 110 as they appeared on the computer screen and to select a comparison under a 0.5 s
DMTS arrangement. Each o f these training steps was performed at 90% or greater b y all
participants prior to the beginning o f baseline probe sessions.
Baseline
Children were shown color “sample” stimuli on a computer screen and after a
variable delay (1 to 15 s) they were asked to choose similarly colored “comparison”
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stimuli by pressing a key on a numeric keypad. Both sample and comparison stim uli were
either red or blue squares.
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EXPERIM ENT 1
Each probe session consisted o f 40 trials - 8 at each o f the intervals, 1 , 3 , 5 ,
10,and 15 s.
Experimental Conditions
Common M ediating Response
Following baseline, children were taught to perform a mediating task during the
delay interval. The common mediating task was non-specific with regard to the color o f
the sample stimulus. That is, the common m ediating task consisted o f pressing the
number 5 on the numeric keypad (center key) following the presentation o f either the red
or the blue color sample. Comparison selections were made after the delay interval
elapsed.
Differential M ediating Response
During the next phase children were taught to perform a stimulus-specific
mediating task during the delay interval. This differential mediating task consisted o f
pressing the top keypad key in the presence o f the red sample and pressing the bottom
key in the presence o f the blue sample. A s above, comparison selections were made after
the delay interval elapsed.
Retum to Baseline (Mediating Response Prevention)
This phase involved exposure to the same conditions as in baseline above.
Children were told that they were not to press any keys during the delay interval. In
addition, access to the numeric keypad was blocked until the comparisons appeared.
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Experiment 1 Results
The results for each participant in Experiment 1 are depicted in Figure 1. A s seen
in the upper panel, K evin’s responding was variable and at approximately chance levels
during baseline, common mediating response and the retum to baseline conditions. He
reached mastery criterion (85% or greater correct responding across a majority o f data
paths for two consecutive sessions) during the 6* session in the differential m ediating
response condition (session 12 overall). The m eans (percentage correct) for each o f
Kevin’s experimental conditions were as follows: baseline, 46% (5I>=19); com m on
mediating response, 50% (5’Z)=12); differential mediating response, 70% (adjusted - 95%)
(SD=2S; adjusted=12); and retum to baseline, 60% (57>=19). Adjusted means and
standard deviations consist o f the results o f the last two data points o f a phase in w hich
there was visual evidence o f unstable data. As seen in the m iddle panel, A lice’s
responding was also variable and at approximately chance levels during baseline,
common mediating response and the retum to baseline conditions, although w ith a
possible increasing trend in the retum to baseline phase. She reached mastery criterion
during the 3^*^ session in the differential mediating response condition (10‘^ session
overall). The means for each o f A lice’s experimental conditions were as follows:
baseline, 40% (SI>=23); common mediating response, 40% (iSZ>=14); differential
mediating response, 89% (iSD=10); and retum to baseline, 60% (adjusted - 72%)
{SD=20; adjusted=15). There was some evidence for an increasing trend in A lice’s
retum to baseline results. The mean percentage correct, combined across all delay
intervals for this phase included 35% correct for the first session and 73% correct for the
last session. Responding was variable but higher in the last session o f this phase than in
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the first for each delay interval. A s seen in the lower panel, K eisha’s responding w as also
variable and at approximately chance levels during baseline, common m ediating response
and the return to baseline conditions. She reached mastery criterion during the 4'*^ session
o f the differential mediating response condition (14* session overall). The m eans for
each o f Keisha’s experimental conditions were as follows; baseline, 42% (5’I>=18);
common mediating response, 40% (SD=20); differential mediating response, 79%
(adjusted - 87%) (5'Z>=17; adjusted=9); and return to baseline, 51% (SD=16).
Experimental control by the differential mediating response (rather than the
addition o f tokens or partial contingency statements) is demonstrated for both K evin and
Keisha b y the results of the retum to baseline phase. For both o f these participants,
results for these phases were similar to those o f the original baseline.
Experim ent 1 Discussion
The major finding o f Experim ent 1 was that correct comparison selections on
DMTS tasks with delay intervals o f 1 s or more required sample-specific, differential
precurrent behavior (differential m ediating response condition). Correct selections
following a mediating response that was not sample-specific (common mediating
response condition) occurred at approxim ately chance levels and were similar to those
seen during both the baseline and retum to baseline conditions. The results o f
Experiment 1 replicated major findings o f previous research in this area (Parsons, Taylor,
& Joyce, 1981; Torgrad & Holbom, 1989).
A likely interpretation o f this effect is that the sample-specific stimulus (finger on
the top key always went with “red,” finger on the bottom key always went with “blue”)
provided supplementary stimulation that was part of a conditional discrimination for the
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selection o f a unique comparison stimulus (Mackay, 1991). Indeed, during differential
mediating response probe sessions ancillary behavior was observed that w ould support
this interpretation. Each o f the participants was seen on at least one trial to lift his or her
index finger from the keypad as the interval ended and the comparison stimuli appeared
on the computer screen, look at the comparison selections and then place his or her
fin g er back on the mediating key which he or she had ju s t been pressing and immediately
make the correct selection. Thus returning the finger to the keypad (re-emitting the
mediating response) in the just-left position likely served the function o f generating the
missing stimulus which, when present, allowed correct comparison selection (Skinner,
1953).
As indicated under “Results,” A lice’s performance appeared to im prove across
subsequent sessions o f the retum to baseline condition. Combined perform ance across all
delay intervals ranged from 35% correct (first session) to 73% correct (last session),
although these data did not show a smooth linear increase (see Figure 2). Visual
inspection o f these averages indicates that improvements might have been reaching
asymptote, or “leveling o f f ’ in the range o f 75%. As described by Saunders and
Williams (1998), 75% correct matching in the case o f two choice MTS m odels requires
further analysis. There are at least three possible interpretations of these findings. The
first is that one discrimination is perform ed at 100% while the other still occurs at chance
levels (e.g., when the sample is red, the red comparison is always selected, while when
the sample is blue, blue is chosen in 50% o f the trials and red is chosen in 50%). A
second interpretation is that, as above, one sample always produces correct selections
while the other produces a position bias. As above, this performance would generate
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approximately 75% correct selection. The final possibility is that intermediate accuracy
represents progress toward full discrim ination and is indicative o f improved perform ance
in the presence o f both stimuli. A further review o f A lice’s raw data indicated that she
responded incorrectly on a num ber o f both red and blue trials and did not seem to
demonstrate any position bias. Thus, the best account o f her performance during these
baseline sessions seems to be the third possibility, namely that she performed at above
chance levels without a stimulus or position bias. When experimenters queried the
participant about employing any strategies to mediate delayed selections, she said she
was not. When asked if she was covertly rehearsing a tact o f the sample stimulus^, she
replied that when the comparisons appeared she would, “Just think it (the correct
comparison) in m y head.” Unfortunately, while it may have proved helpful to gather
more data under this condition, the participant was unwilling to conduct further sessions.
A few minor procedural irregularities occurred during Experiment 1, however, it
appears that these irregularities do not pose a threat to the internal validity o f the findings.
As described above, it was originally intended that all probe sessions would be conducted
under extinction. However, due to particular patterns o f participant responding, it was
decided to deliver tokens and b rief praise statements following correct responses during
probe sessions. This change occurred after 2 Differential Mediating Response sessions
for Kevin, after 1 for Keisha, and betw een Common Mediating Response and Differential
M ediating Response conditions for Alice (see arrows on Figure 1). The addition o f
tokens did not result in improved perform ance for Keisha. In fact, after the first
Differential Mediating Response session her performance worsened. Because Keisha
required many additional prompts while learning to make use o f the mediating response,
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experimenters prompted her during probe trials, after comparisons appeared and before
making a selection, by saying either, “Top goes w ith ...” or “Bottom goes w ith ...” w hile
Keisha completed the statement. These prompts were given in Differential M ediating
Response session 1, not given in session 2 and given again in session 3. During session
4, the experimenter did not prom pt but paused to allow Keisha to emit one o f the above
statements prior to making a selection.
One o f the questions that rem ains after consideration o f the procedures and
findings o f Experiment 1 is that o f the relative functions o f and possible relationship
between the procedures associated w ith the Common Mediating Response and
Differential Mediating Response conditions. As noted above, responding under the
Common Mediating Response condition produced results similar to those seen in the
Baseline conditions while the Differential M ediating Response condition produced
criterion-level responding. Experiment 2 was designed in order to rale out the possible
order effects (B-C) o f always following Common M ediating Response sessions w ith
Differential Mediating Response sessions.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Procedures were similar to those described above under Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 was designed to control for any possible order effects o f the common
mediating response and differential mediating response conditions from Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 controlled for this possibility by eliminating the com m on mediating
response condition. Additionally, Experiment 2 involved fewer trials per probe, w ith
each probe consisting o f 20 rather than 40 trials, or 4 trials at each o f the delay intervals
(1, 3, 5, 10, and 15 s).
Experiment 2 Results
The results for each participant in Experiment 2 are depicted in Figure 3. As seen in the
upper panel, Joe’s responding was variable and at approximately chance levels during
baseline and the retum to baseline conditions. He reached mastery criterion (75% or
greater correct responding across a m ajority of data paths for two consecutive sessions
and a minimum of three total sessions) during the 3^^^ session o f the differential m ediating
response condition (6* session overall). The means for each o f Jo e’s experimental
conditions were as follows: baseline, 47% (57>=31); differential mediating response,
100% (SD=0); and retum to baseline, 60% (SD=27). As seen in the lower panel. Jay ’s
responding was also variable and at approximately chance levels during baseline and the
retum to baseline conditions. He reached mastery criterion during the 5*^ session o f the
differential mediating response condition (10‘*' session overall). The means for each o f
Jay’s experimental conditions were as follows: baseline, 48% (SD=26); differential
mediating response, 88% (adjusted - 93%) (dZ>=l 9; adjusted=12); and retum to baseline,
47% (dZ)=31).
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Experiment 2 Discussion
The results o f Experim ent 2 provided further support for previous findings in this
area (Parsons, Taylor, & Joyce, 1981; Torgrad & Holbom , 1989) as well as those o f
Experiment 1 in the current study. M ajor contributions o f Experim ent 2 include further
evidence that not only was precurrent behavior required in order for children to respond
at or above criterion levels on the DMTS tasks, the precurrent behavior must be samplespecific and improved performance during the differential mediating response condition
did not seem to rely on or benefit from prior exposure to the common mediating response
condition.
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EXPERIM ENT 3
Pre-baseline training and baseline conditions were sim ilar to those described
above. Training procedures described above w ere modified as follows: differential
mediation that previously involved key presses was changed to hand positioning as
described below. Additionally, the 1-s and 3-s delay intervals were eliminated. Each
probe session consisted o f 21 trials, or 7 trials at each o f the delay intervals, 5-s, 10-s, and
15-s.
Experimental Conditions
Differential Mediating Response: Visible
As above, children were taught to perform a stimulus-specific, differential
mediating task during the delay interval. The differential mediating tasks for this
experiment were as follows: given a red sample, cross the index and middle fingers o f the
left hand; and given a blue sample, make the left hand into a fist with thumb up.
Differential Mediating Response: N ot visible
Children were taught to perform the sam e stimulus-specific task and in addition,
place the mediating hand behind their back.
R etum to Baseline (Mediating Response Prevention')
This phase involved a retum to baseline conditions described above. Children
were prompted to place and hold both hands flat on the table in front o f them during the
delay interval. As above, after the delay they selected a comparison via the numeric
keypad.
Experiment 3 Results
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The results for each participant in Experiment 3 are depicted in Figure 4. A s seen
in the upper panel, Julie’s responding was variable and at approximately chance levels
during baseline and the retum to baseline conditions. She reached mastery criterion (86%
or greater correct responding across a majority o f data paths for two consecutive sessions
and a minimum o f three total sessions) during the 4*** session in the differential m ediating
response: visible condition and continued at criterion-level perform ance during all
sessions o f the differential m ediating response: not visible condition. The means
(percentage correct) for each o f Julie’s experimental conditions were as follows:
baseline, 46% (5U=18); differential mediating response: visible, 91% (adjusted - 100%)
(SZ>=14; adjusted=0); differential mediating response: not visible, 100% (SI>=0); and
retum to baseline, 65% (adjusted - 57%) (SD=19; adjusted=13). As seen in the m iddle
panel, Katryna’s responding was also variable and at approximately chance levels during
baseline and the retum to baseline conditions. She reached m astery criterion during the
4*** session in the differential mediating response: visible condition and continued at
criterion-level performance during all sessions o f the differential mediating response: not
visible condition. The means for each o f Katryna’s experimental conditions were as
follows: baseline, 46% (SD=20); differential mediating response: visible, 92% (adjusted
- 98%) (iSD=10; adjusted=6); differential mediating response: not visible, 100% (SD=0);
and retum to baseline, 65% (iSZ>=15). As seen in the lower panel, Jay’s responding was
also variable and at approximately chance levels during baseline and the retum to
baseline conditions. He reached mastery criterion during the 4* session o f the
differential mediating response: visible condition and also during the 4* session o f the
differential mediating response: not visible condition. The means for each o f Jay’s
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experimental conditions were as follows: baseline, 54% (5D=25); differential m ediating
response: visible, 92% (adjusted - 100%) (5I>=17; adjusted=0); differential m ediating
response: not visible, 95% (SD=7); and retum to baseline, 35% (SD=7).
Experiment 3 Discussion
The results o f Experim ent 3 provided further support for previous findings in this
area, such as those o f Lowenkron (1988), Parsons et al. (1981) and Torgrud and H olbom
(1989) as well as those o f the two previous experiments in the current study. Prim ary
contributions o f Experiment 3 include further evidence that sample-specific m ediating
behavior may serve a “precurrent” function, that a variety o f response forms m ay
function precurrently and that the mediating behavior need not be visible in order to be
effective.
In addition to demonstrating a fairly simple as well as portable mediation
mechanism. Experiment 3 provides some elementary support for Skinner’s (1953; 1957)
assertions regarding the development o f responses to covert stimuli and behavior. The
development of verbal behavior descriptive o f and in the presence o f publicly available
non-verbal stimuli, or the tact relation, is fairly straightforward (Skinner, 1957).
According to Skiimer, in the presence o f a ball, if a child says, “Ball,” it is relatively easy
for the parent to confirm and thus reinforce emission o f that tact. However, when the
stimulus is one to which only the speaker has access, as in the case o f a stomachache, the
listener cannot quite so easily agree and thus provide reinforcement. This problem
required a separate and more extensive analysis.
Skinner (1953, 1957) described four mechanisms b y which a person may come to
emit verbal behavior in response to private stimuli. The first and second he called
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“public accompaniments,” and “collateral responses” and m ight be described as
outwardly visible events (physically apparent stimuli in the former case and physically
apparent behavior in the latter) that typically co-occur with private events, as in the case
of various pain-producing events that m ay also produce redness or swelling (public
accompaniment), and m ay also cause the speaker to emit some characteristic form o f
behavior (collateral response) “such as holding the jaw or crying out” (Skinner, 1953, p.
259). A third arrangement involves the metaphorical generalization o f descriptions o f
events perhaps first learned as tacts (e.g., ‘Tmtterflies in m y stomach”). Finally, the
fourth means b y which the community m ay be involved in the development o f a
repertoire regarding private stimulation is perhaps the m ost relevant to the current
discussion: response reduction.
In Verbal behavior, Skinner (1957) described an arrangement in which behavior
occurs that may have originally been publicly observable (and thus came to be tacted),
but is now “executed so weakly or so incompletely that it fails to be seen by another
person, although it is still strong enough to stimulate the behaver h im self’ (p. 133). In
Experiment 3 o f the current study, the mediating response was originally visible to the
participant as well as to the experimenter (Differential Mediating Response: Visible).
This arrangement allowed the experimenter to verify that the correct response was being
emitted. Prior to the probe sessions, prompts and explicit reinforcement were arranged
for this very purpose. In the phase that followed (Differential Mediating Response: Not
Visible), the mediating response was visible to the experimenter but not to the
participant. Thus the response only produced proprioceptive stimuli for the participant
(Skinner, 1953) but still allowed verification and reinforcement b y the experimenter. In
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this case, the mediating response may be seen to have “shrunk,” or become reduced in
size in terms o f its prominence or (visual) availability to the behaver, although not in
terms o f its effectiveness. A n additional benefit o f a procedure such as this is that the
reduced or (metaphorically) private stimulus, while not visually available to the behaver,
is still fully available to the listener, audience, or in the current case, the experim enter. In
terms o f reinforcement or confirmation that the response followed the appropriate
stimulus, the experimenter was completely able to determine whether the response
occurred under appropriate circumstances and could be confident that reinforcem ent w as
appropriate. This procedure then alleviates some o f the weakness in the naturallyoccurring account proposed by Skinner (1957) in which the listener could not be
precisely sure to what stimuli the behaver was actually responding.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study examined the ability o f 5-year-old children to perform tasks
involving what is commonly called short-term m em ory using brief, variable-interval
DMTS tasks. A m ajor finding o f this study was that without sample-specific, differential
precurrent behavior available (Baseline, Common M ediating Response, and retum to
Baseline conditions), children were n o t able to respond correctly on DMTS tasks at m ore
thfin chance levels. Additionally, w hether the form o f the precurrent response was
pressing a keypad key, forming the hand into a position that remained visible or form ing
a hand position that was then not visible did not matter. As was seen in each o f the
Differential Mediating Response conditions, only when a sample-specific precurrent
response was emitted did children perform at or above criterion levels.
This study replicates and extends major findings o f previous work in this area
(e.g., Lowenkron, 1984, 1988; Parsons et al. 1981; Torgm d & Holbom, 1989). Previous
find i n gs were extended by replication o f a similarly robust effect, namely that only w hen

a sample-specific mediating response occurs does it influence responding (as in each
Differential Mediating Response condition). Additionally, w ith the exclusive use o f
within-subject controls (combined m ultiple baseline plus reversal design) the findings
may demonstrate stronger experimental control and have increased internal validity
(Kazdin, 1982). Demonstration that the effects o f the mediating task were reversible
when mediation was prevented was also an extension o f previous examinations in this
area. Additionally, while the claim that within-subject designs are an improvement over
between-groups designs may be an arguable point, they are probably more traditional for
investigations such as the current one and certainly more common in behavior-analytic
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research. Finally, while Experiment 1 demonstrated that the mediating response m ust be
sample-specific in order to have an effect (that is, selection performance was not
improved under the Common M ediating Response condition). Experiment 2 show ed thgt
prior training and exposure to the Common M ediating Response condition was not
necessary in order for the Differential M ediating Response to have an effect. Experim ent
3 provided an extension o f research in this area by illustrating that the mediating response
need not be visually apparent in order for it to control behavior.
The Nature o f Stimulus Control in MTS
A n issue to be accounted for in the current paper is how DMTS performance was
accomplished using the above procedures. Before attempting to do this it might be useful
to consider the mechanism through which more basic forms o f MTS are effective,
although this task may be more difficult than it seems. A number o f authors have
suggested various means through which selections m ay be controlled in MTS and DMTS
experiments. A t least four and possibly five behavioral processes relevant to the current
study m ay be found in the literature. Cumming and Berryman (1965) considered two
early hypotheses and their utility in accounting for more basic (e.g., simultaneous) M TS
as well as complex (e.g., oddity or delayed) MTS processes and/or functional
mechanisms. One possibility is that the sample stimulus (SS) and comparison stimuli
(CO) form a stimulus compound that unitarily serves a discriminative capacity.
However, this does not seem to apply in the cases o f DMTS and zero-delay m atching
because at the time o f comparison selection the original sample stimuli are no longer
present and thus, a part o f the compound stimulus is unavailable. The second
interpretation considered by Cumming and Berryman and also discussed by Saunders and
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W illiams (1998) is that the SS may serve a selective or “instructional” function that
becomes effective in the presence o f the COs. Before discussing this possibility further it
m ay be informative to briefly discuss the rem aining possibilities. A third possibility
(Saunders & Williams) which may easily be applied to exclusion learning but m ay have
broader application as well, is that while matching performance m ay in some cases be a
function o f selection o f the S+ (comparison stimulus programmed for reinforcement), in
other cases it may instead be a function o f rejection o f the S- (comparison stimulus
program m ed for extinction). That is, in the latter cases a child may not learn w hen to
choose red, but instead m ay learn when not to choose blue. A fourth possibility, recently
proposed by Jones (2004) is that the two-CO array serves as a compound stimulus in
which the S+ and the S- collaboratively serve a discriminative function. Although the
third and fourth mechanisms identified above appear to be viable interpretations o f the
mechanism o f MTS, they remain beyond the scope o f the current paper. The last
mechanism to be considered here bears m uch in common w ith the second, above and
involves a kind o f behavioral “coding” (Cumming et al. 1965; Lowenkron, 1984; 1988).
Although coding may appear to be distinct from an “instructional” function, it has
previously been described as functioning similarly to the selective, or instructional
function described above (Cumming & Berryman, 1965; Cumming et al. 1965).
The coding, or instmctional interpretation is especially relevant to accounts o f
perform ance under DMTS but has also been used to account for performance in other
MTS preparations such as simultaneous matching (Cumming et al. 1965; Eckexman,
1970). Under this interpretation, the SS evokes a coding response, R^, which then evokes
a selection response, R®. In the case o f DMTS, the coding response either continues (as
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in the case o f ongoing eye gaze or hand positioning; Blough, 1959; Lowenkron, 1988) or
produces a response product that is still available after a delay (see Lowenkron, 1984).
Coding"^ has been invoked as a mediational strategy in human MTS studies, especially
when a coding response has been explicitly programmed (Lowenkron, 1984; 1988;
Parsons et al 1981; Torgrud & Holbom, 1989) but has also been used to describe non
programmed, response-mediated matching like that discussed by Blough. This usage o f
the term coding is consistent with Skinner’s (1968) use of the term precurrent behavior
and functions, o f course, similarly to the planned behavioral mediation in the current
study.
In the current study, as previously discussed, the presence o f program m ed
differential mediating responses can account for most of the increases in comparison
stimulus selection over baseline. There was, however, one exception to this - the
unaccounted for improvements in A lice’s responding under the retum to Baseline
conditions. As described earlier, Alice reported “thinking” the correci an::.''v£r “in her
head” prior to making selections, alihough she also reported at other times after having
made correct selections that she had not “know n” prior to selection that her choice was
correct. While “thinking it in her head” is a plausible explanation in everyday language,
a simpler, more parsimonious interpretation, and one similar to that reported elsewhere is
that these selections were somehow mediated by a coding response and quite likely a
coding response of which she was otherwise unaware. Blough (1959), o f course,
observed similar behavior in 2 of his 4 pigeons. Lowenkron (1984), Sidener (2003) and
Torgmd and Holbom (1989) reported observation o f similar “bootleg” coding behaviors,
each during experimental conditions in which previously trained coding responses were
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prohibited, as iB the above retum to baseline condition. Suspecting this possibility,
experimenters observed Alice closely during these sessions for sample-specific arm-, leg, eye- and facial-movements but were not able to identify any explicit, differential
behavior such as “thumb positioning” (Lowenkron), “head tilting” (Sidener), or “eye
gaze” (Torgrad & Holbom). However, with no reason to suspect that Alice was
intentionally hiding a covert coding response, and in considering that her perform ance
only reached 73% (and not 100%), if there was coding behavior that served a mediating
function it was likely not behavior o f which she was aware and clearly not effective on
every trial.
A Conceptual Model o f Remembering
The current study provides additional support for the role o f operant behavior in
what is usually called memory. The concept o f memory, however, is not helpful (Palmer,
1991) and not necessary in order to explain remembering (M ahadevan, et al., 2002) or
altered performance (Mackay, 1991; W ixted,1998). Thus, as suggested by Skinner
(1953) and later by Palmer, in a behavioral account, it would be more appropriate to
speak o f “remembering” than o f “memory”. W hile the practices o f our culture m ay train
children to say that they think or remember things “in their heads,” we do not have
evidence for such a storage mechanism (Estes, 1982). On the contrary, there is evidence
that remembering takes place under particular environmental conditions, many o f which
we are often unable to describe.
Future Directions
In light o f the above findings, it might prove helpful in further deterrnining the
role o f operant behavior in the process o f remembering to measure more closely any
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difficult to observe behavior that occurs during DMTS tasks. This would m ost likely
involve m ore sensitive instrumentation than that which was used in the current
investigation. Instruments could be used that measure subtle arm and leg m ovem ents as
well as facial movements and even eye gaze. Other methods that might be employed
could involve better prevention o f possible surreptitious mediational responding, such as
by restricting available visual stimuli to those seen on the computer screen and/or
restricting auditory stimuli via headphones or “white noise” generators. In addition, it
might prove fhiitful to continue to examine more and more subtle forms o f coding
behavior and/or larger delay intervals that begin to span the gap between so-called short
term and long-term memory.
Conclusion
In a special edition o f the Journal o f the Experimental Analysis ofB ehavior
dedicated to “Future Directions in B ehavior Analysis”, Maix (1984) suggested that
behavior analysts apply their efforts, methods and philosophical orientations tow ard the
experimental analysis o f complex hum an operant behavior. But, have we not done so
thus far? M arr seems to think not. These sentiments are echoed elsewhere b y others as
well. DeGrandpre (2000) states, “operant principles represent today only a marginal
force in contemporary psychological science” (p. 721). Not surprisingly, cognitive
psychologists have made similar claims (Dember, 1974; Johnson-Laird, 1988; Miller,
1988). The fact o f the m atter is that behavioral psychology has laid out a framework for
the conceptualization o f human behavior that is not as well regarded today within the
mainstream of psychology as it m ight be (DeGrandpre; Marr). It is sometimes claimed
that reasons for this may be found in the methods o f behavior analysis (Marr, Dember)
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which caution the behavioral psychologist against speculation and steer him toward
discovering truths that are observable and measurable (Skinner, 1987). Other claims
involve the scope o f behavioral psychology, which some suggest is best suited to
utilitarian applications such as behavior modification (Baars, 1988; Barsalou, 1992).
Although vaguely defined processes such as “memory” may not be easily observable or
measurable, the current study provides support for claims that behavioral events involved
w ith remembering can be arranged, observed and measured. There is no reason to
suspect that behavior analysts cannot continue to develop means by which to examine
increasingly complex and subtle human behavior.
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Appendix A
Footnotes
1. For the sake o f brevity only those m ost relevant to the current study will be discussed
here. For more com prehensive coverage see Mackay, 1991 and Saunders &
Williams.
2. Skinner argued that there are a num ber o f ways that people come to behave with
respect to “private stimuli”, or stimuli to which only the behaver has access. One o f
these he termed “response reduction” . In this type of arrangement, a person first
leams to tact outwardly accessible behavior through contact with the environment and
via reinforcement from the verbal community. For example, a girl says, “I am going
home” in the presence o f visible stimuli such as putting on her coat and gathering her
belongings. Later, after this response is appropriately reinforced and may be
executed with some strength, she m ay say, “I’m thinking o f going hom e” when she
observes some private responses that have in the past corresponded to the outwardly
visible responses. The hidden precurrent responses in Experiment 3 represent
behavior that is less physically apparent to the behaver but is not fully private in the
sense o f only being observable to the behaver.
3. Experimenters asked Alice if she was “saying the color nam e to h e rs e lf’ or doing
anything else to try to rem em ber the color.
4. This interpretation relies on a definition o f coding as an instance o f behavior and is
distinct from the hypothetical cognitive memory construct, “encoding” .
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Human Subjects Institutional Review Board
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Date:

February 6, 2003
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David Sidener, Student Investigator for dissertation
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Re:

/U

^

HSIRB Project N um ber 02-11-10

^

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “M ediation o f
Delayed M atching to Sample in Children” has been a p p ro v e d under the full category o f
review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration
o f this approval are specified in the Policies o f Western M ichigan University. Y ou may
now begin to implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You m ust seek specific board approval fo r any changes in this project. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the term ination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events
associated w ith the conduct o f this research, you should im m ediately suspend the project
and contact the Chair o f the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.
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